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4  How to curb conflict




While the lion’s share of the contributions to this volume on instruments 
and tools for conflict prevention focus on concrete insights from spe­
cific cases and situations, often involving specific policies from China 
or Switzerland, this chapter takes a step back and offers a survey of 
statistical results from large­ n studies published in economics and pol­
itical science. Both approaches are useful and complementary, as case 
studies take particularly well into account concrete and specific features 
of the context, while an advantage of large­ scale statistical studies is 
that they contain large, well­ defined, and comprehensive control groups 
which allows us to draw general lessons from policies applied elsewhere 
that may have not received enough attention in other contexts. To give 
a concrete example, one of the many studies discussed below is about 
the impact of school construction in Indonesia on the likelihood of pol­
itical violence (Rohner and Saia). This study finds a very strong paci­
fying impact from fostering primary education. Obviously these insights 
cannot be simply blindly applied to other contexts that may be very 
different from Indonesia. Still, the mechanisms highlighted in this work 
may well apply beyond Indonesia, and provide inspiration for (maybe 
smaller scale) pilot projects elsewhere.
Below, I offer a summary of some recent statistical results on peace 
and war in economics and political science, before highlighting more 
concretely, towards the end of the essay, how these findings could 
inspire governments and policy makers. This chapter starts briefly out­
lining why we should care about tackling turmoil: conflicts are very 
costly from both a human and socio­ economic point of view. After this 
short discussion of motivation, the emphasis will, second, shift to a few 
major root causes of fighting, namely poverty, natural resources, and 
ethnic division. Armed with this overview, the third and final part of 
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this short discussion will then focus on potential medications to cure the 
ills of political violence.2
Costs of conflict
Like the causes, the costs of conflict are manifold, ranging from fatal­
ities over economic costs to societal damage. The maybe most imme­
diate concern and easiest cost to grasp is in terms of human suffering. 
According to Bae and Ott, the conflict­ related deaths in the 20th cen­
tury were as large as 109.7 million, corresponding to 4.35 percent of the 
world population. Of these, 60 percent were civilian non­ combatants. 
Hopes that the end of World War II were to give way to a new age of 
perpetual peace were swiftly dashed: between 1945 and the end of the 
20th century, an estimated 3.3 million people lost their lives in 25 inter­ 
state wars, while an estimated 16.2 million people perished in 127 civil 
wars (Fearon and Laitin), and much violence also occurs away from 
the battlefield, when armed troops turn their weapons against civilians. 
Since World War II, some 50 episodes of mass killings have led to 
between 12 and 25 million civilian casualties (Political Instability Task 
Force).3
Also, the economy of a war­ torn country gets damaged in various 
ways. Not only does destruction of physical infrastructure entail a high 
toll, but also days spent fighting correspond to a loss of productive 
labor. Unsurprisingly, the economic costs of conflict are sizable by any 
standard. Collier estimates an average war to reduce annual economic 
growth by 2.3 percentage points, leading to a total loss of 15 percent 
of GDP for the average war duration of 7 years. Even conflicts with a 
below­ average death toll, like the separatist fight in Basque Country, 
can lead to very sizable economic consequences. According to Abadie 
and Gardeazabal, the comparison of the Basque GDP to a synthetic 
control group of comparable regions with similar characteristics but 
without violence, leads to the conclusion that Basque GDP would be 
about 10% higher today in the absence of ETA’s armed fight.
Finally, conflict also imposes costs on the society. While the litera­
ture has found a clear­ cut effect of conflict exposure during childhood 
in reducing human capital accumulation (e.g. Shemyakina; Swee) and 
in increasing future crime propensity (Couttenier et al.), the impact of 
conflict on social capital is more controversial (see e.g. the survey of 
Bauer et al.). While some studies have found that conflict depletes trust 
and boosts ethnic identity (e.g. Cassar et al.; Rohner et al. “Seeds of 
Distrust”), other studies have also found beneficial effects, in particular 







Three prominent root causes of political violence have received consid­
erable attention in economics and political science in recent years: pov­
erty, natural resource abundance, and ethnic heterogeneity.
The conceptual reason for the emphasis on poverty as a potential 
driver of conflict is simple: having a limited amount of time available, 
people have to choose how to spend it and face an opportunity cost of 
all options not selected. Concretely, joining a rebel group means giving 
up work. While the opportunity cost of leaving the work force is low 
when jobs and perspectives are lacking, it is very high for individuals 
with large human capital and well­ paid jobs. Put differently: it is much 
easier to recruit fighters in a weak economy. There is indeed a large lit­
erature finding that poverty is a powerful correlate of conflict (Fearon 
and Laitin; Miguel et al.; Collier and Hoeffler; Collier et al.).
A second major factor that has been often investigated as a root 
cause for conflict is the abundance of natural resources, which represent 
rents that can be grabbed and a higher price for appropriation. Other 
mechanisms put forward in the literature include the fact that natural 
resources may fuel secessionism, that the need of capital for resource 
extraction may crowd out labor intensive sectors and hence lead to lower 
wages, or that the control of mines and oil wells makes the financing of 
rebellion more easily feasible. A variety of articles have documented a 
strong link between natural resources and conflict, including, among 
many others, Fearon and Laitin; Collier and Hoeffler; Dube and 
Vargas; Lei and Michaels; Caselli et al.; Morelli and Rohner; Esteban 
et al. “Strategic Mass Killings”; and Nicolas Berman et al.
A third often­ cited factor is the role of  ethnic diversity. One under­
lying conceptual logic is the idea that ethnicity can be a powerful 
marker for collective action (see e.g. the theoretical papers of  Esteban 
and Ray; Caselli and Coleman). A  variety of  statistical studies have 
found that ethnic polarization goes along with a greater likelihood of 
civil conflict (Montalvo and Reynal­ Querol; Esteban et al. “Ethnicity 
and Conflict”).
Policies for peace
While there is no consensus in the economics of conflict literature on 
what the key policies are to stop political violence, there are a selection 
of policies and institutions that appear promising in the light of the 
empirical evidence. We can group these into four categories: stability; 
incentives; institutions; and trust.
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First, as far as stability is concerned, there has been documented the 
importance of state capacity (Besley and Persson), and in particular the 
crucial role of establishing security and functioning public service provi­
sion (Eli Berman et al.). Second, what has been found to boost incentives 
for peaceful behavior are factors that make the economy strong and that 
provide jobs and long­ run perspectives for prosperity. In particular, edu­
cation is found to reduce the scope for conflict (Collier and Hoeffler; 
Thyne; de la Brière et al.; Rohner and Saia), and employment programs 
and job market access are pointed out as major factors that attenuate the 
incentives for violent behavior (Blattman and Annan; Couttenier et al.). 
Related to this are also the findings in Nicolas Berman et al., highlighting 
that by reducing the potential gains from victorious conflict, peaceful 
behavior can be promoted. In particular, they find that transparency on 
mineral origins and high levels of corporate social responsibility attenuate 
the conflict risk. Third, when it comes to the impact of institutions, sev­
eral articles in the literature have highlighted the non­ monotonic impact 
of democracy. It has been found that regimes with “intermediate” democ­
racy levels face the largest conflict risk (Hegre et al.; Fearon and Laitin), 
and that democracy tends to reduce conflict in rich countries, while it 
may fuel conflict in poor states (Collier and Rohner). Two recent studies 
find a clear impact of full democracy and franchise extension reducing 
conflict (Laurent­Lucchetti et al.; Rohner and Saia). There exists also 
evidence for particular aspects of democracy. In particular, institutional 
constraints, the rule of law, proportional representation, and feder­
alism correlate with having fewer civil wars (Easterly; Reynal­ Querol; 
Saideman et al.; Besley and Persson), and power­ sharing has been found 
to reduce the scope for fighting (Cederman et al.; Mueller and Rohner). 
Fourth, building trust has a variety of angles and aspects. While concep­
tually it is argued that taking measures that promote inter­ group trust 
may boost inter­ group trade and hence increase the opportunity cost of 
forgone trade in the case of conflict (Rohner et al. “War Signals”), the 
empirical evidence shows that reconciliation ceremonies (Cilliers et al.) 
and bilateral pacification of inter­ group hostilities can reduce grievances 
and the scope for conflict (König et al.).
Conclusion
Conflict costs are large by any standards, and directing research efforts 
at this topic are crucial. While the literature in conflict economics 
has gained an overview on major causes and consequences of armed 
fighting, up to recently the study of how particular polices can reduce 




however, a series of interesting results have been reached on how the 
scope for war can be reduced. Further research on this policy­ relevant 
angle to the conflict question is strongly recommended.
In terms of real­ world implications for international policy makers, 
there are plenty of implications to be drawn in the light of the evidence 
cited above, in terms of improving stability, incentives, institutions, 
and trust. To give just one example, education tending in general to 
be a pacifying force, global policy makers and governments may con­
sider supporting international initiatives and programs – for example, 
by helping to fund further schooling. But on top of the aforemen­
tioned policies that are largely defined at a national level, there are also 
some inherently transnational policies that may be promising. Nicolas 
Berman et al. have, for example, found that transparency and certifica­
tion initiatives for minerals extracted can reduce their potential scope 
for conflict. This is an example of a cause requiring broad international 
support and where policy makers and governments around the world 
can make a real difference through international cooperation.
Notes
 1 Dominic Rohner is grateful for helpful comments by Courtney Fung.
 2 This current literature review essay draws on earlier survey papers of Rohner 
(“The Economics of Conflict and Peace”; “The Economics of Peace”). Given 
its short length, the focus is necessarily selective and the goal is to showcase 
some relevant recent work on the economics of conflict, without any claim 
for completeness.
 3 Indirect casualties from epidemics and disease among the weakened 
populations cause at least as many fatalities as direct casualties (Ghobarah 
et al.). Beyond physical injuries and death, psychological effects of conflict 
exposure are widely documented (see e.g. Barenbaum et al.).
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